Iranian foreign policy between the base and the variable By:----- Dr. Sultan Al Nuaimi

Iranian foreign policy between the base and the variable
By: Dr. Sultan Al Nuaimi
Date: 20 November 2018
In its regional and international perspective, the Iranian vision is based on different, historical, or "outdated" principles. However, its influence remains on the decision-maker in Iran. Rather, it motivates it to elect various means and means to strengthen Iran. To the degree of interference in the internal affairs of States, and to support movements and parties loyal to money and weapons to be used as tools in the conflicts of Tehran and its attempts to extend influence in the region.
The study of these pillars and their interaction among themselves and their impact on the Iranian decision maker as well as the employment of active institutions, is important in the prospect of Iran's foreign policy, which in turn prompts a number of questions of what are the pillars of the Iranian regional and global perspective and have changed before After the revolution of 1979?
How do these pillars become specific to each other and what drives them to do so? What are the frameworks of Iranian foreign policy and the state's interactions and revolution? How do Iranian powers and institutions interact at the regional and international levels?
The decision-maker of Iran's political decision-making and issuing statements regarding foreign policy and dealing with international resolutions and political events are based on basic principles and values ​​that sometimes come together and become specific to each other. Factors such as cultural, historical and religious heritage and the regional and international weight of States play a role in the emergence of these pillars.
Foreign policy, as Mohammed Kazem Sajad Pour sees it, is a series of interconnected episodes that combine many factors that influence foreign policy. While we find that there are foundations on which all other countries, particularly the "interest" base, come together, others vary from state to state. The most important pillars that play a role in political decision-making in Iran can be found in the following:
a. The basis of Persian nationalism and pride. Iran's cultural and historical heritage has made Persian nationalism an important pillar of political decision-making in order to secure the support of the Iranian people. The social aspect reflected in various forms plays its role in Iran's foreign policy. The Iranian society is considered one of the most important social bases that directly reflects the Iranian national identity.
Iran was home to one of the ancient empires, which is reflected in Iranian foreign policy. This importance is driven towards the focus of Persian nationalism on the other pillars of Iran, but justifies and provides justification for the survival of the national dimension of the dimension away from everything that would affect it, and thus a negative reflection on those who take power and loss of the factor An important source of internal support.
B. The interest base. Where the interest comes first in making a decision. Ethical values ​​and resonant slogans often do not have a foothold when they collide with the interest. International relations are based on the principle of interest, which comes as an important pillar of the political decision-maker in Iran, and the interpretation of his turn here to justify the justification and create ways to achieve the interest, without directly collide with other elements.
If the interests of the Iranian regime require dialogue with America, the regime, says Mohammad Jawad Larijani, head of the Human Rights Commission of the Judiciary and the brother of the head of Iran's judiciary and legislature, is willing to talk to it even at the bottom of hell.
Dr.. Religious dimension. As the only Shiite state and the leader - as you see - the Shiite doctrine, the latter has become the pretext of the victory under his umbrella as a pillar of Iran's political decision-maker. This dimension has become an integral part of the Iranian constitution. In reality, however, this position is dependent on the interest and the facts of the Iranian regime.
This does not in any way mean extracting the sectarian and religious character of this system. However, the support of those who condemn the Shiite doctrine does not mean that this regime is in addition to this basis if the interest is its role which is incompatible with it.
Between two periods
The interest base remains an integral part of Iran's policy throughout the ages and punishes governments and regimes. In this sense, there is no difference between the Shah's period and the current period in seeking to maintain the focus of the interest, but it is worth noting that there is a difference between the realization of the interest on the basis of reciprocity, and in the framework of international law, between the interest at the expense of others and through interference in their affairs Interior.
As the national dimension is rooted in the Iranian personality and gives the regime or the government popular support, Iran's dream of emerging as a big country in the region has been and continues to be a strong anchor that successive regimes seek to achieve.
What was done by Mohammad Reza Shah and before him Reza Shah, has returned to reflect the current system. This can be traced through many statements that go in this direction, where Khomeini sees in his literature that the eye of the regime looks beyond the border and this is translated into the form of blatant interference in the affairs of the countries of the region.
It can be said that the difference that can be observed between the period before and after the "revolution" of 1979 lies in the means and not in the pillars, but used the means to achieve the latter.
When we look at Mohammad Reza Shah's period, the interest and national dimension was clear and achieved during the era of Muhammad Reza Shah after his relations with the United States reached its peak, let alone diplomatic relations with Israel and the arrival of the Iranian military force to the fifth rank among the armies of the world. And was willing to reach the ranks of the world countries
Globalism that satisfies nationalism and interest. It is possible to say that the Shah's nationalist tendencies, reservations, and even reservations about the religious establishment and the attempt to neutralize its role did not contribute to the rise of the religious dimension and its adoption as a pillar in Iran's foreign policies at the time. After the fall of the Pahlavi regime and the rise of the religious trend to power at the expense of the other currents that took part in the 1979 "revolution", it was necessary to continue to promote the interest and the basis of nationalism and thus continue to seek the emergence of Iran as a regional power, But the problem was that those methods employed by the Pahlavi system no longer existed. The spring of relations between Iran and America has passed and the latter has become the "Great Satan". It has become deeply rooted in the minds of Iran's leaders that Israel's hostility, hostility and call for its elimination are an engine to highlight the religious orientation and Islamic dimension of the new order. As such, it was only Iran that sought new ways, beginning with the division of the world from its point of view to a dominant power and a follower, and forces of resistance to hegemony. Revolution and the State The uncertainty surrounding Iran's foreign policy and its divergences remains a source of interest and analysis of those interested in the Iranian issue, as well as the countries of the region that are directly affected by these policies. There is no doubt that addressing this issue leads to the raising of a number of questions that would give a clearer picture of this subject. Are there any double standards in Iranian foreign policy? Where is this ambiguity located? Iran's President Hassan Rowhani said that he seeks to create a positive atmosphere and good neighborliness, especially with the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia, to accuse the kingdom of supporting Saddam's regime. Hussein in his war against Iran, which is contrary to spiritual calls for the leaders of the Guard to avoid statements that would affect the efforts of his government towards openness towards the Gulf States, and Saudi Arabia specifically. On the other hand, while Bahrain's King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa sends a congratulatory message to the Iranian president on the anniversary of the Iranian revolution in 1979, Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei receives a group of Bahraini opposition, who he described as strong. This gives an indication of the emergence of this duality and divergence in Iranian foreign policy. This, in turn, leads us to the second question of where this divergence and duplication occur. First, the Iranian regime moves towards foreign policies in accordance with the vision of the guide and his directives by virtue of the powers he enjoys according to the Iranian constitution. The rest of the regime's institutions also play their part in that policy, but they remain in accordance with the framework of the Iranian system, which revolves around the status of a leader who has the power to formulate public policies of the state. Including foreign policy. Therefore, it is necessary for us to read Iran in the right way to know its outputs in view of its system and its institutions that overlap its powers in many aspects. This reading will lead to the realization that the Iranian Foreign Ministry is not like its counterparts in other countries. At the time that this ministry graduated with a statement that preceded or coincided with other statements dealing with the same from other institutions. Therefore, the arrival of a moderate or reformist government and the appearance of clear changes in the statements of this government to move from the hard to the moderate does not necessarily mean a radical shift in Iranian foreign policy. As Abbas Araghji, assistant secretary of state and chief negotiator for Iran's nuclear program with the 5 + 1 group, says, "The principles and values ​​of foreign policy are firm, but it is normal to deal with issues differently depending on governments. "This is not a matter of any change in principles and values," said Iranian parliamentarian Ahmad Toukli. "The general policies of the regime and higher authorities are in fact fixed rules, and the impact of changing presidents can affect how public policies are implemented." There are many institutions in Iran that play an external role, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs itself has its own privacy. The president of Iran is the one who chooses the foreign minister. However, whoever is in charge of the sovereign ministries must come with the blessing of the guide. Therefore, the office of the leader and his political administration will have their role in formulating policies. This prompted former Iranian President Ahmadinejad to take steps to expand the powers of the president and his influence on the State Department, where he appointed his special envoys to circumvent the narrowing of the foreign ministry's direction, . The Supreme National Security Council has also played a role in this regard. Iraq has seen numerous visits by former Secretary-General of the Council Saeed Jalili, as well as current Secretary-General Ali Shamkhani, who appears to have played his role in persuading former Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki to give up Prime minister. Shamkhani also had his own visits. As well as Lebanon and others, which leaves no doubt that this Council also has its role in foreign policy. The Quds Force, the foreign arm of the Revolutionary Guards, which is considered a terrorist organization, plays a role in foreign policy by supporting armed groups in the region, both financially and militarily. Thus, it can be said, as Jahnabkhash Yazdi pointed out, that there are factors governing Iran's foreign policy
Including formal and informal. The overlap of real interests The increasing overlap between the powers and duties of various institutions within the scope of Iranian foreign policy is the existence of many foreign policy principles that lead to some kind of contradiction between these principles. Interpretation comes to give a loose space for each institution in its interpretations and thus move to the practical side of the arena of foreign policy. Therefore, given the principles of foreign policy, it is clear that there are two elements, one fixed and the other variable. The latter is reflected in the reading, interpretation and method of implementing those principles, which in turn remain a constant element. The examinee of the principles of Iranian foreign policy can note that the source of duality emanates from those principles that intersect among themselves, leading to the emergence of such a duality. When we look at the principles of Iranian foreign policy, such as refraining from any kind of interference in the internal affairs of other nations, peaceful and reciprocal relations with peaceful states, national territorial integrity, and political, economic, social and cultural independence in the principles of Iranian foreign policy. There is no doubt that such principles may be shared by many States, which are moving towards respecting the rules of international relations and moving towards their interests away from interference in the affairs of others. At the same time, however, other principles of Iranian foreign policy contradict the aforementioned principles. Which is rejected by the Iranian regime and confirms the absence of such contradictions, based on his interpretations and his own reading in this regard. As mentioned above, the current Iranian regime has come up with a completely different idea of ​​its position vis-à-vis the United States and Israel. The current system has no access to other tools. These tools have in turn led to the emergence of this disparity between the principles of the current Iranian foreign policy. The ninth article emphasizes that this is the principle and basis of the Iranian government, which is clearly reflected in the foreign policy of Iran, especially in Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kashmir. The Iranian regime intervenes in the internal affairs of other nations. . The export of the revolution and the tools that are already a dilemma in the Iranian regime's use of the outside and the contrast and duplication of the "revolution" versus the state are the use of concepts such as the theory of Umm al-Qura and al-Mahdawi, as well as the export of the revolution and the Islamic government. Which drives the Revolutionary Guards and the Quds Force to rush out of the Iranian border, citing many of Khomeini's statements and the importance of exporting the so-called "revolution" as one of the fundamentals of the "Islamic government." In order to achieve its great objectives, the Iranian revolution for the Iranian people goes through five stages: the Islamic revolution, then the Islamic system, then the Islamic government, then the Islamic state and finally the global Islamic civilization. This duality would not have gone away with the death of Khomeini, but it remains intact in the current Iranian regime to continue to reach the main goal of the rest of the successive regimes on Iran, to transfer that imagination to reality by the means available. After the death of Khomeini and the revision of the constitution, the members of the Supreme National Security Council, headed by Hashemi Rafsanjani, came to the conclusion that the regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran would not last without expanding the scope of the Islamic revolution beyond the borders of Iran. Accordingly, Iran's foreign policy-makers strove to place Iran as a "motherland of Islamic countries" so that it could become a center and base for Islamic movements, which must be supported materially and morally in order to gain power, thereby perpetuating the Islamic Republic of Iran. The goal of the Iranian regime is "to spread Shiism in the world and raise the banner of the Mahdi." In this context, the commander of the Revolutionary Guard, "We are in the process of Export Basij Experience ». Among the evidence that confirms this duality is the clear role of the IRGC in its interventions in the region, which was clearly demonstrated by the continued visits of its leader Qassem Soleimani to Iraq recently, which conveyed the Iranian presence in Iraq as a form of denial, Through the spread of pictures of the commander of the Quds Force in a number of Iraqi cities and the official recognition of the presence of elements of the Iranian military in Iraq in order to support the Iraqi army in the face of the organization calling for the terrorist. Qassem Soleimani's call to the Council of Experts in Iran to brief the Council on the situation in the Muslim world, especially Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Lebanon, is clear evidence of this double-dip in foreign policy. This Council was free to call the Iranian Foreign Minister or his representative from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as the primary responsible. Iran's military officials have their share of statements that reflect that duality in Iranian foreign policy and confirm that they are within the influence of many of the Iranian regime's institutions. "In order to accelerate the return of the Mahdi, it is necessary to bring about changes in countries surrounding Iran," he said in the role of Mahdawi. Major General Ismail Qa'ani, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Quds Force, said that Syria can not stop only. "Our goal is always to lead the entire Muslim world." With regard to the Iranian regime's use of the term "Islamic Awakening", which the Iranian regime uses to describe Masami in the Arab Spring revolutions, to give an Islamic dimension and Iranian influence to these revolutions
Through the Iranian revolution in 1979, the imam and preacher of Jomah Tehran believe that it is a pave the way for the Mahdi, and therefore it must be supported financially and morally. From the foregoing, we can say that divergence and duality is a matter of Iranian foreign policy, which lies between the two pillars of the ideology of the revolution and the hammer of the concept of the state. Revolutionary ideology remains its pivotal role in Iranian foreign policy, which in turn creates a divergence in the foreign policy principles of the Iranian regime. Although there is support and opposition to the approach of some of the institutions of the Iranian regime in its foreign activities, it can be said that all of them ultimately seek the goal of the President is to become Iran, as said former Foreign Minister and President of the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization Ali Akbar Salehi the golden key of the Middle East and the force The first is that the world has no choice but to deal with Iran. Thus, the security belt of the region can not be completed without Iran, as the former Iranian ambassador to France said. * Mohammad Kazem Sajjad Bor: Gargoub Hai Mafti and Bazhou Shubra External Policy Review Iran, Gap Suff, Political Review Book and Al-Malali Center for Gap and Consultations and External Affairs Ministries, Tehran, 1386 H. p. 2. * Ibid. P. 4. * For more information about The role of the national dimension in Iran and its impact on foreign policy See: Ahmad Sadeghi: Tabbar Shannas External politician Republican Islamic Iran: Jakeh Hoyt, Farhang and history, separation of foreign policy in the case of Best and Dom, a book of political readings and between the mullahs and foreign affairs, Tehran, p. 256,259 . * SITE Iran Diplomatic 17-Aban - 1391 H. www.irdiplomacy.ir * Zahra Bishkahi Fred: Iran and America Dr. Khourmianye, Gap Dom, Sazman Geography of Neruhai Militant, Tehran, 1388 H. p. 42. Powers of the Guide Article 10 The functions and powers of the Guide are as follows: * Appointment of the general policies of the Iranian regime after consultation with the Council of Expediency Assessment. * Oversee the good conduct of public policies of the system. Issuing a public referendum order. * General Command of the Armed Forces. * Declaration of war and peace and public purity. * Set up, isolate and accept the resignation of: • The scholars of the Council of Guardians. • The highest official in the judiciary. • President of Radio and Television Corporation of Iran. • Chief of Staff of the Joint Command. • Commander-in-chief of the Revolutionary Guards. • Senior leaders of the armed forces and internal security forces. * Resolve differences and regulate relations between the three authorities. * Solving system problems that can not be solved by normal methods through the system of interest diagnosis system. * Signing the decree of inauguration of the President of the Republic after his election by the people. As for the validity of the candidates for the presidency of the Republic in terms of the availability of the conditions involved in this Constitution, they must obtain before the election approval of the Guardian Council, and in the first session obtain the consent of the leadership. ⅦRemember the President of the Republic, noting the interests of the country, after the issuance of the ruling of the Supreme Court of the failure of his legal functions or after the opinion of the Islamic Shura Council on the lack of political efficiency, on the basis of Article eighty-ninth. * Amnesty or commutation of sentences of convicts after the proposal of the head of the judiciary, and the commander can appoint a person to perform some of his functions and powers. Iran's Presidential Elections, Influences and Results 2013 Model, First Edition, Sibar Center (Iran), Jap I, Farhanki Foundation, Mawla'at and Investigations between Al-Melli Abar and Mu'aser Tehran, Tehran, 1389 AH, p. 107. See Jahanbakhsh Yazdi (Doctor) P. 40 * Zahra Bishkahi Verd: Penrookhohi Iran and America Dar Khawramianh, a previous reference p. 52. * On the theory of Umm al-Qura See: Mohammad Jawad Larijani: Mqolati DR Tratzi Melli, Center for Translation and Publication of Books, Tehran, 1369 AH pp. 43-60. Ali Reza Azghandi (Doctor): Foreign Policy Republican Islamic Iran, Jaap Jahram, published by Qomas, Tehran, 1386 H.S., 34-36. [4] * Ali Reza Azghandi (Doctor): Islamic Republic of Iran's Foreign Policy: Iran, Iran, Iran and Iran. . (P. 34) www.alalam.ir 17 October 2014 www.iran-newspaper.ir 21 Aban-1393 H * Islamic countries claiming to be under the influence of the West * Developing countries claiming to be under the influence of the West * Developed and Western-Compatible Countries * European Countries * United States of America Resistant Resistance Camp: * Insurgent Movements in Developing Countries * Non-Muslim Peoples in Non-Developing Countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America * Iran Dominance Camp: * Academic and Researcher in Iranian Affairs Ruling on the foreign policy of the Republic of Iran Factors of official character * Guide: According to Article 110 of the d The Supreme Council of National Security in accordance with Article 176 of the Constitution * The Islamic Consultative Assembly in accordance with Articles 67, 71, 76, 77, 78, 80, 81, 82, 84 and 89, especially through the National Security and Foreign Policy Committee. Ministries, executive institutions, the judiciary and the armed forces also play a role in Iran's foreign policy structure

 Source: Electronic Al-bayan