The Sochi Convention .. gains and challenges

The Sochi Convention .. gains and challenges
an introduction
On Monday, September 17, 2018, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Russian President Vladimir Putin announced an agreement to stop the control of Idlib by the Assad regime and to establish a buffer zone around the Syrian province of Idlib at a depth of 15-20 km by mid In October.
The agreement came a few days after the tripartite talks between the Russian and Turkish presidents failed with Iranian President Hassan Rowhani in Iran. The Sochi agreement was highly welcomed internationally, and observers saw the success of Turkish diplomacy in keeping Edlib away from the scourge of war, being the last stronghold of the Syrian opposition and sheltering many displaced Syrians. But the question remains: What gains have the parties made through this agreement? What are the most important challenges that may be an obstacle to its success?
Highlights of the agreement
This agreement provides for a number of points;
- The establishment of a demilitarized buffer zone at a depth of 15-20 km along the line of contact between the armed opposition and government forces by 15 October.
- Ensuring Russia's commitment not to attack Idlib.
- Russia's guarantee that Turkey will remain a partner in the Astana process.
- Evacuation of the demilitarized zone from all extremist armed groups.
- The withdrawal of heavy weapons, tanks, rocket launchers and artillery from the opposition factions by 10 October.
- The Turkish side proposes to resume transportation through Aleppo, Lattakia and Aleppo-Hama before the end of 2018.
Iran's absence from the meeting and its position on it
Iran is one of the three guarantors in the Astana negotiations, 4 in which a memorandum of understanding was signed to establish safe areas in Syria. Under the agreement, the tripartite talks between the heads of Russia, Turkey and Iran were held in Iran on 7 September, The Iranian side, which supports the continuation of military action, is the reason for his absence this time from the Sochi meeting, despite his participation in the meetings of the International Triennale on the implementation of the terms of the constitution.
Iran's Foreign Minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, praised the outcome of the meeting as "responsible diplomacy." This position will remain the Iranian option for the agreement unless there is a Russian retreat for a number of reasons. , The most important of which is Iran's need for Russia and Turkey, especially in this circumstance in which it is subject to American sanctions.
Gains
There are gains achieved by the Russian and Turkish parties through this agreement, and the agreement has a positive impact on the Syrian civilians, while the Assad regime did not achieve any of the gains, but lost Idlib, which was for him the last strongholds of his opponents that was arranged to attack it and the announcement of the restoration of the last bastions Controlled by the Syrian opposition.
The most prominent of these gains:

First: Russian gains
- proved to be the first player in Syria, and they are the first decision maker before the system itself.

- has managed to maintain Turkey as a strategic ally; it is not in Russia's interest to abandon Turkey.

- The exit of the exit to save her face; that the battle that was arranged did not receive the light of international green, but used the US veto against any military operation in Idlib, Perhaps one of the main reasons that led to the hardening of the international position against the battle is fear of the wave of asylum that Will increase if Russia decides with the Assad regime to control Idlib, which is home to more than four million Syrians.
- Preservation of its military bases in Tartous and Lattakia.
Second: Turkish gains
- The success of Turkish diplomacy in achieving a new breakthrough in the Syrian file.
- Turkey was able to balance its improved relationship with the Russian regime and its moral position towards the Syrian people.
- Cut the way to the Kurdish organizations, classified by Turkey on the list of terrorism, from reaching the White Sea.
- Reducing the wave of Syrian asylum to Turkey, and realizing the Turkish dream of establishing a buffer zone housing Syrian civilians in their homeland and protecting them from the adventures of asylum.
- Strengthening the Turkish military presence in Idlib, strengthening existing control points set up by Turkey in the area of ​​reducing tension in Idlib, and equipping them to be able to protect themselves and protect Syrian civilians.
- The dismantling of extremist groups and their removal from opposition control areas with Russian support.
Third: The gains of the Syrian opposition
- Idlib spare the military attack, which was arranged by the Syrian regime and with Russian support.
- Mitigation of external asylum, its adventures and its future effects on their demographic structure.
- Raise hope for a political solution.
Challenges
This agreement has a number of challenges, both in terms of how to implement the terms of the agreement, or those relating to the booby-trapped points that may constitute a pretext for a party to overturn or circumvent the agreement unless there are real understandings between the parties.
- Evacuation of Idlib from armed groups and their destination
Idlib has thousands of armed elements, and evicting them is a challenge for Turkey, especially those coming from outside Syria, or groups classified as terrorists, such as the Sham Liberation Organization (formerly Nasra Front), Al-Qaeda- Islamic), as well as the organization (Dahesh). As for the Syrian fighters, most of them are in the liberation brigade of the Sham or factions close to it, groups that do not carry terrorist ideology, which makes it easier to integrate them into the forces of the Free Army or the National Liberation Front, but with regard to the previous groups we have two options:
The first option is the peaceful dismantling and identification of these groups; this option requires the security and political experience of the Turks to dismantle the armed groups and overcome the dilemma of direct confrontation
To spare civilians who are embroiled in the scourge of war and to provide safe means for these groups to ensure their safety. This option may be likely, but requires the rehabilitation and integration of these groups, or facilitating their exit to the areas they wish to leave, taking into account that some of the leaders of these groups have links with some intelligence services, which requires more effort than the Turks. Option 2: armed confrontation. This option may be resorted to by Turkey if these groups refuse to surrender. This is an option that Turkey may be drawn to further exhaustion in order to make it easier for the external parties to achieve their objectives, whether those of dividing Syria or penetrating national security. If Turkey succeeds in dismantling these groups, there is another challenge with regard to weapons, both with respect to disarmament and with respect to determining its fate: to Turkey or to Russia. - Time Challenge There are other challenges related to time, whether it is time to implement the terms of the agreement, whether it will be on time or not, or how long it will take, and whether it will end politically or militarily, because there are those who believe that Russia wants a political agreement And thus the real guarantee of the agreement will be a guarantee of its success. - The infiltration from non-parties to the Convention and this challenge lies in the coup of those parties that are not in the agreement but directly related to it, whether Iran or the Assad regime or the armed groups, the coup of Iran is but a small percentage as before, while the Assad regime is looking at the agreement As a time frame, and his position on the control of Idlib is clear, and therefore he may seek to achieve his objectives through this agreement, and this makes his choice of agreement possible; because he does not want any political solution, and will continue maneuvering and may take advantage of the opportunity to disarm to achieve its objectives , As for armed groups, it is a breach of the LTTE Especially after the leaders of the Sham Liberation Organization (formerly the Nasra Front) rejected this agreement. Conclusion This agreement does not mean that Idlib can not spare the option of war. These parties may find themselves forced to confront the implementation of the terms of the agreement, especially if they reach an impasse with the armed groups inside Idlib, but this agreement has its benefits for all sides. Enhances its chances of success, as well as international support for the agreement. However, the chances of success or failure of the agreement remain. Perhaps the success of the agreement is likely to be the need for Russia at this time in particular, its interest with Turkey is greater than its interest in Idlib, and Russia and Turkey are determined to continue the course of Astana with all its might. The option of a coup d'état by one party to this Agreement remains to be avoided.

Center for Strategic Thought Studies