The absence of the national project and the crisis crisis, political development and revolution (12-5)- Abdul Ghaffar Mohammed Saeed

The absence of the national project and the crisis crisis, political development and revolution 12-5
Abdul Ghaffar Mohammed Saeed
March uprising of April 1985
On March 26, students at Omdurman Islamic University sparked the uprising, as their union marched through the center of the city, bringing together large numbers of citizens in the market area. The workers of the industrial zone of Omdurman joined the crowds and then widened the progress of Islamic students demonstrations and all the workplaces and housing in the capital triangular. The masses began to flow into the streets and enter into an open clash with the symbols of power. The demonstrators went to the American Embassy and burned the American flag and smashed the embassy cars chanting the fall of America, and then broke the glass facade of Faisal Islamic Bank and smashed some cars. Three people, William, Abdul Jalil Taha and Mohammed Mohammed Abdullah, were martyred this day. The demonstrations continued as Cairo University students left Khartoum branch on March 28 as they poured into the street and protected the masses of women and men.
Thus, the Intifada continued to escalate and the numbers of the masses who were in favor of the streets increased until the fall of the regime on 6 April 1985
The Intifada suffered from clear and decisive weaknesses. On the ground, the National Rally was unable to spend on a charter until late on the morning of April 6, 1985. When the talks with the Transitional Military Council began, representatives of the RCD were still disagreeing with the transitional period's program, duration and powers of the transitional authority, let alone its relationship with the transitional military junta, which had not been counted.
The situation on the ground resulted in two authorities, one of which was the Military Council, which emerged as the representative of the Mayo power rejected and defeated by the people, and the National Union (unionist and partisan) that led the uprising. In the beginning, the assembly was in a stronger moral position because it was based on the masses and the revolutionary legitimacy, but the differences between its representatives opened a wide gap that led to the progress of the military and seized the opportunity and took them to take the initiative to become the owners of the sovereign and legislative authority, which unfortunately led representatives of the assembly to accept the situation without resistance . The representatives of the Umma Party and the Democratic Union played a significant negative role in their hostile stance against the left and the democratic forces, which allowed the Muslim Brotherhood and their allies, even in the selection of ministers, to occupy a significant number of sites without No entitlement, while they were completely isolated and was easy to strike hard on them.

After Sadiq al-Mahdi assumed the post of prime minister, the war continued between the north and the south, and the laws and laws of September were not repealed. Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi described it as "not equal to the ink it was written". Instead, al-Sadiq al-Mahdi tried to replace it with Islamic laws. Al-Siyassa newspaper, September 11, 1987, demanding that the September laws be abolished and that the Kokdam Agreement be considered the basis for negotiations and a peaceful solution. The whole South, the response of Sadiq al-Mahdi attacked as strange assembly, calling secularism and take Garang movement traitorous demanded assembly convicting.
The true adherence to the September laws and his alliance with the Islamic Front in what was called the National Reconciliation Government in May 1988, in which Turabi was appointed Minister of Justice, is the clearest evidence of his primary role in aborting the uprising and denying its principles and the demand of the Sudanese people to abolish the September laws.

What are the consequences of this ominous situation?
The results of this situation are summarized as follows:
First, the absence of a national project agreed upon by the forces of the Intifada, not only that, but overcoming the small partisan ambitions on the general national concern led to the reduction of the transitional period to one year without any convincing reasons. In the negotiations before 6 April 1985, at least.
Secondly, it led to the imbalance of power in the Intifada institutions between the military junta and the government, and within the government itself. This led to isolating the democratic forces and the Intifada forces in general from participating in the drafting of the constitution and the electoral law. The most important result of this imbalance was the weakening of the positions of the democratic forces, which contributed to the continuation of the civil war in the south with the same Mayan approach, while the overthrow of the Maoist regime provided an invaluable opportunity to find a solution to the southern problem in favor of democracy, unity and progress.
In this regard, it is worth mentioning the position of the SPLM, which called on workers and students to continue the Intifada and described what resulted in it as May 2. The uprising was a popular act. However, in all circumstances conditions changed and new data emerged. The democratic forces sought to form a trade union and party to persuade the movement to join the forces of the Intifada in the new political climate. Regardless of their opinion of it, and without receiving their weapons. This was possible and would affect the balance of power much, but it was rejected.
It can be said that the political map in the wake of the fall of the Mayan regime was as follows:
The emergence of the National Rally for the Salvation of the Homeland (both its trade unions and parties) with a general democratic program, but with fragile composition and differences that are not easy.
- armed rebellion in the south led by the SPLM, in addition to the old southern political entities and despite the broad sympathy between the democratic forces in the north with the movement, but did not establish an effective joint action leads to the convergence of the movement with the democratic forces and the integration with them in a joint work leading to the cross-fertilization and transfer of experiences and Of experience.
The Transitional Military Council represents senior officers and is my right
Orientation. . The Islamic National Front (NIF), with huge financial capabilities due to the unlimited financial support it received from Saudi Arabia under US guidance under the pretext of fighting communism and influential positions in various state institutions as a result of its alliance with the Nimeiri regime and the entry of its leaders the Socialist Union (NAM) And the occupation of Muslim Brotherhood leaders to various positions in the country. It was natural for all this, in addition to the remnants of the Mayo regime, that all these contradictions would ignite old conflicts and new conflicts. The main issues surrounding the conflict were: 1 - the liquidation of the effects of May. Especially the laws of September and institutions left behind by the regime. 2 - Correct the course of the economy and raise the living hardship. 3 - Stopping the civil war in the South by addressing the reasons and causes that led to it. The balance of power in the period following the outbreak of the Intifada can be summed up as follows: the masses stand up to the objectives of the Intifada, and this is explained by continuing pressure until the security apparatus is dissolved. And unite the masses in the press area and drop Turabi in the (circle of uprising). And rejected large sections of the masses of the Umma Party and its intermediate leaders of the party alliance with the Islamic Front. The democratic forces emerged exhausted and exhausted by the strikes of the Maoist regime as a result of their related resistance (leftists, trade unions, national officers, democratic forces in the state apparatus, etc.). The results of the elections resulted in a constituent assembly dominated by slogans of Islamization, primarily the maintenance of the laws of September and the orientation towards an Islamic constitution and the enactment of anti-democratic legislation and progress. This period was characterized by a climate of general defeat in the Arab region and the role of neighborhood. The continuation of the civil war provided justification for the slogan of rescuing the armed forces and the homeland, launched by the right-wing forces, which paved the way for the June 30 coup later. On November 16, 1988, the leader of the Democratic Unionist Party, Mr. Mohamed Othman al-Mirghani, signed a peace agreement and a final solution to the civil war in southern Sudan, and the issues of unity and peace. With the leader of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) Dr. John Garang in Addis Ababa. The masses have come out to welcome the "Merghani" at Khartoum Airport, a joy and joy to the man of peace in Cornwall, carrying the branches of the Neem trees and the signs of this great achievement. But Prime Minister al-Sadiq al-Mahdi refused to implement the understanding and worked with the National Front to disrupt the signing of the agreement in various tricks and ways. In the text of the Moroccan agreement, the following: A - Since the National Constitutional Conference is an urgent national necessity that requires all Sudanese political forces to work diligently and sincerely to create the atmosphere for the conference, the two sides reached the conviction that the basic factors necessary to create the appropriate atmosphere are: However, at this stage, and in light of its keenness on the National Constitutional Conference to agree to freeze the border materials and all related articles contained in the laws of September 1983, and that no laws are issued containing Those materials until such time as the National Constitutional Conference to separate the question of laws. 2. Abolish all military agreements between the Sudan and other States that affect national sovereignty. 3 - Raising the state of emergency 4 - Shooting b - Forming a national preparatory committee to prepare and prepare for the convening of the National Constitutional Conference and to develop the draft agenda and determine its location and procedures and convening the Committee and its first meeting once it was formed. The Parties agree that the National Constitutional Conference shall be held in a place to be decided by the National Preparatory Committee, where all the guarantees mentioned in this Agreement shall be available to the satisfaction of the parties concerned. The parties agreed on the necessity of convening the National Constitutional Conference on 31/12/1988 in the event of implementation of the items mentioned in this Agreement to the satisfaction of the parties concerned. The Parties call upon all Sudanese political forces to immediately join this sincere national effort for peace and stability of the country. . It came after Sadiq al-Mahdi and al-Trabi rejected the Sudanese Armed Forces Memorandum of February 20, 1989, which precipitated the FIS coup on June 30, 1989. Thus, the March-April uprising has been stolen and derided since early, since the failure of representatives of the people to agree on the charter before the outbreak of the intifada in a timely manner and then the different parties around the ministries. Here, the shallow size of the parties demonstrated the mass public action. Despite the fact that one of the most important effects of May, which was rejected by the people, was the September laws, the Sudanese right-wing forces deliberately kept the September laws and called after the uprising the Islamic constitution. The Sudanese right-wing parties did not learn anything. from U.S For an uprising as they did not learn all the lessons of previous history
 Source: Urbanized Dialogue

* Abdel Ghaffar Mohamed Said - a journalist and a Sudanese researcher