By Farzin Nadeemi and Michael Knights /
"This observatory is the third in a three-part series on the Red Sea campaign in Yemen, covering the strategic risks and opportunities inherent in preventing Huthis from reaching the sea, and the operational challenges facing the two sides around Hodeidah."
The Huthis warned that any attempt to free both Hodeidah and Salib, the only two ports of heavy cargo under their control, could generate a harsh response. These measures are likely to include an increase in rocket attacks on Saudi Arabia and perhaps the United Arab Emirates as well, with efforts to disrupt the shipping corridors in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab. Previous events illustrate the context:
On 12 November 2017, when the Gulf Alliance halted all traffic to Houthi ports for a brief period, the rebels threatened to attack Saudi tankers crossing the Bab al-Mandab Straits. The channel "Al-Masirah", which promotes the propaganda of the Huthis that "the battleships and oil tankers of the aggression and movements (in reference to the Arab alliance and operations) will not be safe Huthi naval forces if the Supreme Command issued directives to launch an attack."
On 9 January 2018, the head of the Houthi Supreme Political Council Saleh al-Samad, who was later killed in an air strike on 19 April, threatened to cut off shipping lanes in the Red Sea if the coalition continued to advance towards Hodeidah. "If the aggressors continue to move towards Hodeidah and if the political solution reaches a dead end, there will be some strategic options that will be taken as a point of no return, including the prevention of international shipping in the Red Sea," he was quoted as saying on Al-Masirah.
Cross-border attacks on the "Gulf Alliance"
If the alliance intensifies its attack on Hodeidah, Huthi forces are likely to respond by stepping up cross-border attacks on Saudi Arabia and perhaps Western Sahara in the UAE. Key attack patterns can include:
Tactical rockets, drones and short range ballistic missiles. It is very likely that such a double bombing would target Saudi border towns, civilian airports, military bases, industrial complexes and oil in Jazan, Najran and other West Coast cities. Such attacks will use SS-21Scarab-B missiles (OTR21 Toshka), multi-purpose BM-27 rocket launchers, new long-range Badr-1 missiles and SAM- 2) "unedirectional transformer" (referred to as al-Houthis as "omnipotent" and "2m"). A Badr-1 rocket was launched at the Jazan facilities of Aramco on 14 May. The Houthis are likely to support rocket attacks by unmanned aerial vehicles, such as the Iranian-supplied Qusif 1, which they recently used on 11 April in an attempt to hit the Jazan refinery.
Medium range ballistic missiles. The Houthis operate in a limited number of Iranian long-range Qaim 1 long-range ballistic missiles (called 2K Volcano), as well as some remaining SS-1C / 5 Scud B and long-range Scud C-6 missiles. The rockets have hit Riyadh on three occasions since they began operating. A wave of attacks on Riyadh could begin in an attempt to exacerbate the crisis, entice the Saudis to retaliate harshly and draw international calls for a ceasefire. Similarly, the Houthis may launch Q-1 missiles on the western border of the UAE to extend the war geographically to a new state, and they have clearly indicated this capability. On September 14, 2017, Commander Houthi Abdul Malik al-Houthi claimed that the UAE "is now within the range of our missiles." The Houthis may be able to drop a missile into the desert of the UAE after further modifications to the explosive charge, materials and fuel.
Terrorist attacks. The Gulf Alliance confirmed that the intelligence material captured showed that the Huthis may be preparing to carry out terrorist attacks in cities in Saudi Arabia, including assassinations and storming government sites.
Destabilizing the Red Sea and Bab el Mandeb
The Houthis control about 560 km of the coastal Red Sea line between the nectar and Medi, including many islands. An Iranian "mother ship" (Safiz) is set up on the Dahlak archipelago, the port of Hodeidah, Salih and an oil loading station in Ras Issa. From these bases, the Houthis launched dozens of attacks on coalition bases in the Red Sea, the Alliance's shipping lines, the international shipping corridors on the Red Sea, and the Bab al-Mandab terminal point, a vital provider of the European energy market. Across the strait, about four million barrels of oil a day pass through the strait, the most important after the straits of Hormuz and Malacca. Huthi's proven anti-ship techniques include:
Anti-ship missile attacks. The former Yemeni naval forces were known to possess the B-21 Stix II, the Chinese version of the I-2 and the anti-ship C-801. The Houthis launched these anti-ship missiles for the first time by targeting a Swift I cruise near the northern entrance of Bab al-Mandab on October 1, 2016, using the Houthis alleged to be a C- 802 ". In 2016, missiles were fired on the USS Mason warship on 9, 12 and 18 October by an unknown type of anti-ship missiles operated by the Houthis. The Houthis also maintain their remaining missiles and coastal radars in the wake of US retaliatory attacks
Mia risk. With regard to the operations of the launch of ballistic missiles, the United States should be involved in a timely process for the exchange of cautionary statements and specify the geographic location of anti-missile missiles, offensive and speedboats, and other marine attacks that could put the ships at risk. The Iranian "mother ship" in the Red Sea should be closely monitored to ensure that it does not facilitate maritime attacks by providing data aimed at the movement of cargo ships. Most importantly, the destruction or destruction of port facilities and the laying of mines at ports will complicate and delay the return of humanitarian flows to the most populous areas of Yemen. Washington must closely monitor the operations of the coalition and those carried out by the Houthis during the Hodeidah campaign and should immediately disclose whether any party wants to deliberately cause damage to port facilities and berths. Should US officials to urge strongly the UN Special Envoy to Yemen, Martin Griffiths, humanitarian agencies, and the Member States of the United Nations to send a warning to Huthists point where that rebel forces would be considered responsible for carrying out a scorched or rocket fire earth strategy at the port, if Participated in such activity, as well as warning the Gulf Alliance of targeting port facilities. The United States must also warn the Iranians, who are the main suppliers of arms to the Houthis, they consider them complicit if they fail to curb the Houthis from the use of scorched-earth methods or expand the scope of the war using Iranian weapons. There is ample legal justification for issuing such a warning. In the wake of the Iranian missiles fired into Saudi Arabia from Yemen examined, "the United Nations Panel of Experts" report concluded in January 2018 that "the Islamic Republic of Iran in non-compliance with paragraph 14 of resolution 2216 (2015)", in reference to the prohibition Weapons imposed by the United Nations on the Houthis under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. Farzin Nadeemi is a fellow at the Washington Institute and a specialist in defense and security affairs related to Iran and the Gulf region. Michael Knights, a senior fellow at the Institute, has recently returned from a visit to the fighting fronts in Yemen, where he received detailed briefings from Yemeni officers and Gulf alliance officers on naval tactics and Huthi weapons. Source: The Idea Forum The opinions expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect the views, views or official policies of the Middle East Broadcasting Network (MBN)
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