U.S. President Barack
Obama's demand that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu agree to an
immediate, unconditional cease-fire was not the first instance in which
an American president bore his entire weight on Israel to get it to hold
its fire and to bring about an end to fighting in the Israeli-Arab
arena.
In 1956, U.S. President
Dwight D. Eisenhower put heavy pressure (which included a suspension of
economic aid) on Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion following Operation
Kadesh, to get the prime minister to withdraw immediately from the Sinai
Peninsula. U.S. President Ronald Reagan didn't dissemble either his
anger or frustration with the expansion of the First Lebanon War in July
1982, and his administration took a series of specific, albeit limited,
steps to punish the government of Prime Minister Menachem Begin.
But in contrast to
those instances, when a certain strategic logic anchored U.S. conduct,
current American "policy" stands in blatant opposition to American
national interests as defined by Obama when he was first elected. Beyond
maintaining the "special relationship" between the U.S. and Israel, the
president declared his ambition to establish political and security
cooperation with the moderate Sunni camp in the Arab world, led by Egypt
and Saudi Arabia, to prevent a dangerous regional vacuum from being
formed after the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq. And now, in polar opposition
to these goals, which were intended to protect the Middle East from
radical forces, we are witnessing a behavioral pattern that gives de
facto backing to the standout representative of radical Islam -- Hamas.
This pattern reached
its apex two days ago in a phone conversation between Obama and
Netanyahu, but was preceded by the bizarre actions of Secretary of State
John Kerry. Just when the time was right to revive the vision of a
regional defense alliance with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the Gulf
States (Qatar excluded), who are united in their strong opposition to
Hamas and its ilk, we are seeing an American policy line based on
ignoring that axis completely, particularly the Egyptian component.
This means that the
deeply rooted American diplomatic thinking about the region has been
breached, and it can't be explained by considerations of practical
diplomacy. As far as we can tell, it's a combination of an ongoing
grudge against Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi, whom the
administration is not willing to forgive for taking power by
not-strictly democratic means, Kerry's deep frustration with Israel over
his failed mediation attempts, and presidential anger at Jerusalem for
the way it rejected the draft cease-fire agreement the administration
put together with its lackeys and Hamas representatives.
But beyond these
explanations, there is a fear that the situation is even worse, and that
the U.S.'s cockeyed view of Hamas shows a fundamental lack of
understanding of the group's character and the significance of the
terrorist threat. Indeed, in his ambition to distance himself from the
ideological and strategic legacy of his predecessor George W. Bush,
Obama has crossed the Rubicon and adopted the narrowest possible
definition of this challenge. Therefore, to the same extent he did not
hesitate to nurture his relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood, which
ruled the Land of the Nile with an iron fist in the days of Mohammed
Morsi (a Hamas patron), the American president has no qualms about
trying to justifying his wrongdoings while all the frightening aspects
of the terrorist state Hamas created in Gaza are being exposed.
Nothing remains to be done but hope that the administration will shake off its delusions, and sooner rather than later.
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