The framework agreement and the idea of bulding the state (1)

 The framework agreement and the idea of building the state. (1).

  Written by / Hatem Babiker Awad Al-Karim

The threats and dangers of the transition after the uprising (2018-2019 AD) increased and became complicated at the beginning, due to the widespread belief of the Sudanese political elites, that it is a repetition of the uprisings of October 1964 AD and April 1985 AD, and they have the right to believe in linking the public role in changing the pyramid of power with widespread mass protests with The contrasting mechanisms of the political strike, massive mass demonstrations, and the widespread popular sit-in in front of the General Command on April 6, 2019, which paralyzed the Salvation Army and hammered the final nail into its coffin.

The nature of the difference between the uprisings of October 1964 AD and April 1985 AD from the uprising (2018-2019 AD), shifts in the nature of the weight of the Sudanese state as a result of experimentation and missed opportunities in building the Sudanese state, as the longest civil war in the continent of Africa led to the division of the Sudanese state on religious and ethnic grounds, Sudan is under the tutelage of IGAD, the partners of IGAD, and the Security Council. What does it mean that the existence and future of the Sudanese state is no longer the only actor in which the Sudanese elites or the will of the Sudanese people are, just as Sudan, after the independence of the south, is no longer a millionaire, as it differs in its geopolitical importance, strategic role, and its influence in its borders. Also, the Sudanese army, according to the Naivasha agreement, has become limited and defined in roles and deployment, which created conditions for the creation of the Rapid Support Forces. The second issue, which created a contrast between the recent uprising and its predecessor, is that the culture of the armed popular revolution, which imposed the 2005 agreement, has become an advantage for large sectors that have tended to absorb weapons to address the shortcomings of building the Sudanese state.

  The difference of the uprising (2018-2019) in terms of political forces and issues of national construction, therefore, the transition process became complicated and headed for complex cycles titled strategic confusion, strategic vacuum, weak role of the inside, sovereignty of the outside, blurring of national interests, and clarity of regional and international interests. What is the safe way to move? Does the framework agreement achieve an appropriate and appropriate road map for the Sudanese political situation?