A pause to contemplate the rebellion's attack on Al-Aylafon.
Written by Dr. Hatem Babakir Awad Al-Karim
An objective understanding of the rebel forces’ attack on Al-Ailafoun does not mean the army’s failure to perform its duties and the inability of the security services to anticipate this action, but rather it necessarily means several issues. First: The rebellion is declining and it was defeated in the Battle of Khartoum, which is why it is trying to carry out operations aimed at creating media hype. The Al-Aylafoun operation is inseparable from the desperate movements in the north of the island, with logistical and media support that exceeds the scale of the operations.
Second: The events of Al-Aylafoun confirm that the tactical plans are based on diverting attention from the reality of the army’s total control in the capital. Therefore, the rebellion needs to raise the morale of its soldiers, blocking the story of support and supplies coming from Libya and Chad, especially since the valleys have dried up and autumn is at its end, so the rebellion is expanding the geography of war. Trying to buy time.
Third: The military rebellion in Khartoum is linked to the political goals of the forces supporting it nationally and regionally. The strategy of these forces is based on creating a humanitarian situation that allows for a quick settlement. The operation is part of the plans to paralyze the state from performing its functions and to blame the army for the effects of the war because it is stubborn.
Fourth: The Al-Aylafon operation comes as part of a deliberate action to separate the people from the army by mixing the army’s doctrine, which is based on protecting the state, with its basic components, the most important of which is the human being and the land.
Fifth: Operation Al-Aylafon comes to confirm that the danger is not the rebellion movement, it is merely an employee of political forces whose approach is “as for the authority, the burning of Sudan.” It is the one who planned the April 15 coup and it accompanied the framework agreement, so the rebellion is nothing but a performance to achieve the goal The Al-Aylafon events, despite their limited and tactical nature, revealed a number of dangers: 1 - The war imposed on the Sudanese army and people is supported by media propaganda stronger than the presence on the ground, as the goal is to kidnap the state. Inadequate state media, lack of political awareness and awareness of the nature of the war and its goals.
2- Weak executive performance and its tendency to become lax, that is, adapting to the state of war and dealing with it as if it were on another planet, which means not understanding the nature of the war and targeting the state’s very existence.
3 - Lack of awareness of the goals of the regional powers in supporting the rebellion. Countries do not spend money in wars for emotional reasons, but rather for fundamental interests. The regional interests of Sudan’s neighboring countries are for Sudan to remain in a state of confusion, and for the strategies of the axis countries to be further away, so this is decreed in the strategies of either kidnapping the state, dismantling Sudan, or making it In a constant state of confusion.
4 - The state knows that this war is to change its course and to defeat the hostile vision requires international and regional action with international organizations, the region, and the main forces in the international community. Before and after that, a strict media discourse that does not accept hesitation and gray descriptions has clear positions in international relations, including dealing with international and regional forces with an interest in stability. Sudan aspires to deal with it, like China, South Africa, Algeria... and others
It is important that the national forces keen on the Sudanese state absorb the lesson of Al-Aylafon and accelerate the crystallization of a political and popular discourse that increases the energy of public mobilization and exposes the political and military forces of rebellion, their actions, positions, propaganda, and working mechanisms. It is important that the army absorbs the tactics of the rebellion and besieges the enclaves of the fifth column that it supports logistically, medially, and diplomatically, and employs the forces of the state. The media is besieged by the propaganda of the rebellion and its media. It is important for the people to understand the nature of the war and its dimensions that target their existence, identity and interests, and that it rises to the level of foreign penetration into the national environment. They must deal with the level of challenges and risks. Everyone must come out of the state of complacency, adapt and become accustomed to the war and confirm that it is a temporary situation that will be defeated with the strength of the forces of the Sudanese state. It is also necessary to deal with it. With the war with a balanced internal and external media vision away from individual initiatives, it is shameful that the Numeiri Military Academy does not have a strategic media awareness that deals with this urgent temporary circumstance.
Written by: Dr. Hatem Babakr Awad Al-Karim
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