Dr ..Hatem Babiker Awad Al--krim Mahell - The idea of dissolved the army is anaccumlated stock in the sudanese partison poitical thought.t

 The idea of dissolving the army is an accumulated stock in Sudanese partisan political thought.

   Dr.. Hatem Babiker Awad Al- Karim Malell

The dialogue on the framework agreement as a basis for the transition between the forces of the uprising (2018-2019) made the issue of building a unified, professional army the basis for the future Sudanese state. The task has economic and intellectual dimensions and the future of building the state. The fundamental problem is in the concept adopted by the political forces for this treatment imposed by the political framework. The Sudanese army has been laying the basis for bargaining and dialogue about the homeland since the outbreak of the national movement in southern Sudan in Torit August 1955 AD, and thus it is the main actor. In building the Sudanese state throughout the era of independence, the partisan political thought is inherently abiding by the relationship with the Sudanese army. In 1976 AD, the forces of the National Front entered Khartoum, which is an extension of the Ansar Army, which lined up with Imam Al-Hadi in the island, and the army dealt with it in the events of March 1970 AD. How does the partisan political thought view the Sudanese army and its future? The answer calls us to look at the intellectual foundations of the five groups that make up partisan political thought and their position on the army, its development and its future.

  First: The federal parties viewed the Sudan Defense Force, which was established in 1925 AD, as an expression of the British rule in Sudan when it suppressed the 1924 AD uprising. The project of unity with Egypt will only be by returning to unity with the Egyptian army.

Second: The independent parties, the largest of which is the Umma Party, which believes that the bilateral rule that was based on the Egyptian-English agreement in 1899 AD - the destruction of an independent Sudanese state that had its own army, which was crushed in the Battle of Omdurman, September 2, 1898 AD. The main directions are the abolition of the colonial army and the building of an army whose core is the principles of the new Mahdism that emerged after the October 1964 uprising, which made the reproduction of the Mahdism on new bases the program of the Ummah Party.

Third: The Marxist left is inherently classist and internationalist. Its model is the state of the Soviets with its red army and its models in the newly independent countries - the people’s army that protects the national democratic revolution and then the transition to socialism. After May 1969 AD, the basis of the dispute between the communists and a regime that was built on the basis of changing the army to become a popular army. It led to the movement of July 19, 1971 AD and the massacre of the Guest House, the junction between May the Marxist left and the quest to build revolutionary democratic republics on the leftist horizon - the Nasserist and Baathist nationalists.

 Fourth: The Islamists are a supranational organization that seeks to return to the golden age of Islam, so it needs an Islamic army. Therefore, its desire to build an Islamic army remained a slogan chanted by the masses after the uprising of April 1985 AD, “Muhammad’s army will return.” When the Islamists seized power with an Islamic vanguard from the army on June 30, 1989 AD, they cared. Building a parallel army "Popular Defense Forces" to become an alternative to the regular army as a prelude to dissolving it, but the contradictions of the civil war in southern Sudan (1983-2005 AD) prevented the completion of the effort to dissolve the army, and the internal contradictions of the regime also hindered any plan to make the popular defense the basis for the Islamic army. The liberal Islamic current moved With the economic horizon to besiege the ideological current, the regime split into two ideologies and two liberals in Ramadan 2000 AD.

  Al-Bashir regime sought to establish a support force that would become an alternative to the army after the Naivasha agreement in 2005 AD, and these forces developed and the rapid support was born as an expression of the alliance of Gulf capital and rescue technocrats to monopolize power and achieve total control over the Sudanese belt (from the Red Sea to the Atlantic Ocean), and what happened on April 15 2023 Not to proceed in completing the change of state structures to suit the dominant forces with continental aspirations allied with the Gulf petrodollars.

  Fifth: Arab and African national trends. The African nationalist forces, represented by South Sudan, established their own alternative army to the Sudanese army since May 19, 1983. The vision of the new Sudan is based on military and political integration between the periphery forces to besiege the center, i.e. reaching the point of dissolving the old army and building the unified revolutionary army. From the mantle of the armed revolution in southern Sudan, the armies of the armed movements emerged.

   Arab nationalists consider the Arab armies to be the creation of foreign colonialism, and their project is based on establishing a vanguard cell in the army that seizes power and then reformulates it according to the theory of revolutionary democracy that was applied in Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Yemen. In Sudan, they supported the regime of May 1969 AD until they removed the Communists in 1971 AD, and they also had another attempt to seize power in April 1990 AD, or what is known as the Ramadan coup.

    The intellectual perceptions of the political movement are always tending to get rid of the national army as an obstacle in the face of the eradication and partisan aspirations of its origins and its creed since its first birth in 1925 AD. The military coups could not replace it, just as the three democracies did not succeed in transforming it, so the Sudanese army became the last institutional obstacle that prevents integration into the system. The regional economy that seeks to mate between Gulf capital and national resources.

  Can the Sudanese army find a role in the equation and escape the dangers of a solution that, if it happens, will automatically affect Egypt, Algeria, and the cohesion of the lakes system and southern Africa?