Crises of the post-rescue state and the problem of political thought to build the state. (1).
The incident of the military deployment in Meroe
Hatem Babiker Awad Al- Karim.
# The uprising (2018-2019 AD) produced new strategic military-political weights in the Sudanese scene that cannot be bypassed without joint action to build the state. The internal affairs and the regional and international systems - the issue of the single national army is inseparable from the issue of building the Sudanese state that expresses all the Sudanese, and it is not a secondary issue that is solved by political tactics, as happened on the eve of independence by pledging to the parliamentary bloc of the south in federalism in exchange for voting in the Constituent Assembly for independence, and on this agreement was the declaration of independence from within Parliament on December 18, 1955 AD, and after that the parties retracted the agreement, and the function of the army was shifted to maintaining internal security, and the armed forces were deployed in the south as a prelude to the dismantling of the Equatorial Division, which strengthened its uprising in August 1955. It became a fire that lasted fifty years - the issue of the unified one army is not a simple issue and it does not concern Absolutely, the People's Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces, but rather all the political and military forces active in order to form a Sudanese reality different from the history of failure. A "new state" that fully expresses all Sudanese components and the interests of the people of Sudan transforms the military doctrine of the national army from internal security tasks to protecting the borders and upholding the constitution and the law. .
The Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces have not always been in absolute agreement (working as one institution), they have their own understandings, contradictions, intersections, and balances (internal and external) under which they work that affect their positions, performance, and aspirations. For both - regardless of the laws and the quantitative and qualitative dimensions of each system, they are not enough to express decisively and accurately what the future Sudanese National Army is, unless there is an agreement here on the nature of the Sudanese state, how its system of governance and institutions, and the function of the armed forces, and these are still pending matters that some evade as a strategic task for tasks Takiya dreams of the return of the central holding.
The problem that surfaced recently in the city of Meroe sparked radical contradictions in the perception of the future (between the Rapid Support Forces and the armed forces and a future with the armed movements). The issue of building one army is not unification as well as merging and demobilizing forces. It is not possible to escape from it by terrifying the results of the clash. Reaching this point came with blood and blood. Therefore, formal administrative arrangements cannot be tolerated. Rather, it is necessary to rely on the approach of the thought of building the modern state. The limited problem is an expression of real transformations that came to a different voice in reading the political history of the state - accumulations of positions and struggles. It took place throughout the six decades of independence - so the structure of the Sudanese state after the rescue is not the same as the structure of the state inherited from the foreigner on 1/1/1956 AD. The painful situation that took place under the bridge of adherence to absolute centralization, and the political mind is still unable to recognize the state of South Sudan as a reality that resulted from the poor performance of successive governments that employed the national army to perform internal security tasks. Sudan supported independence with a mute, vague phrase, “secession,” as if everyone had fulfilled their duty towards unity. It is nothing but insistence on describing the will of the south as a “kharijite position,” which indicates a lack of recognition of the independence of the south, and the reality of the independent state that is a member of the international community, which confirms that it is a tactical position that awaits the change of strategic balances To impose unity with the army’s tool, in a huge crowd, political thought gathered in front of President Salva Kiir, Mayar Dade, chanting in Khartoum, “We will not go back until the south returns.” 2005 and the internationally monitored historical referendum, it is the same imbalances that sparked earlier the war between the two states of Sudan over the Heglig region and the international borders in the quality of pottery and the Abyei region. The real problem that warns of innumerable problems and times is the political negligence and political negligence in which the partisan political thought is obsessed, which constantly makes the Sudanese state’s vision of itself and the era damaged and confused due to the absence of political thought to build the Sudanese state that knows itself, its rights and duties, and its role in the international community.
The crisis of the multiplicity of centers of power affecting the decision-making of the state after the uprising results mainly from the tactical and operational mind that lacks a strategy, as decision-making does not express a state’s vision or a state’s strategy, and then you see that agreements and treaties are tactical matters that can be retracted and modified by the armed forces, so if the political forces admit And the military that took over the governance after the uprising with internal changes - the Rapid Support Forces, an independent force according to the constitutional decision issued by the Transitional Military Council that amended the status of the Rapid Support Forces, so the Rapid Support Forces became an independent regular force, thus the security and defense strategy of the Sudanese state became part of its formulation and planning Rapid support, so it became parallel to the armed forces and a contributor to all the tasks of the national army.
The strategic decision of the state’s tasks is no longer exclusively an absolute right for the Sudanese Armed Forces according to the Constitutional Document and the Juba Agreement of October 2020. The Juba Agreement, October 3, 2020, established the foundations for the independence of military movements (according to the protocols of the military and security arrangements), unless the conferences stipulated in the 2020 AD agreement are held. With the documented recognition of the rapid support for regular military forces independent of the armed forces during the transitional period.
There is no way to escape forward, turn back the clock and choose the tactical way to empty the agreements of their content, and these are the objective mounts that led to the resignation of Prime Minister Abdullah Adam Hamdok after the procedures of October 25, 2021 AD.
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