Iran after Bombay's speech: sanctions and regional boiling/ By Joyce Karam

US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo
Iran after Bombay's speech: sanctions and regional boiling
By Joyce Karam /
Mike Pompeo wanted to be his first speech since becoming US secretary of state on Iran. Drew a sharp divergence from the policy of Barack Obama, and attended a regional hot stage in attempts to stop the tide of Iran after 15 years of the Iraq war and make the future of this policy a measure of the success of Trump external management.
The speech was remarkable, including 12 requests from Iran, which means the effective implementation of the end of the role of the Iranian regime as we know since 1979, and did not include a hint of the military option and the exception of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to talk about Syria. Beyond Bombay's speech, three American tracks can be discussed in dealing with Iran:
1 Economic sanctions Since the withdrawal of Donald Trump from the nuclear deal, the US Treasury Department has issued five rounds of sanctions against Iran and its arms in Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen and included Hezbollah with its political, military, charity and economic wings. Here, it should be noted that the sanctions against Hezbollah have been shared by all the GCC states, including Qatar, Oman and Kuwait (though Kuwait has not included Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah), which could pave the way for other Gulf Arab moves.
Pompeo said the Supreme Leader would "never live" and that was the first US index to enter the post-Khamenei battle
Inevitably, Hezbollah leaders do not invest in Wall Street or in sanctions-stricken international markets. But the size and framework of actions that included large names inside the party are complex in their funding network from the Far East to the heart of Africa. This may harm the business circle surrounding Hezbollah more than the leaders themselves and increase the pressure on the party's allies inside Lebanon and Iraq on the eve of the formation of their new governments.
Also in the sanctions is the willingness of the administration and Congress to impose nuclear sanctions, which were suspended after 2015 to further isolate Iran economically. Today, despite the clear and overt US-European political row over Iran, European companies will not risk being sanctioned. The Iranian climate, even after the nuclear agreement, was not positive for investment. Therefore, in recent days we have seen the withdrawal of Total, Siemens, Allianz, BP, Maersk and other contracts signed with Iran before the end of the summer sanctions deadline.
2 Increasing regional pressure: Since 2003, US influence has declined regionally against the growing Iranian influence. While the Obama administration has tried to live with this idea and reach a strategic geo image that adapts to that influence as long as it does not threaten Washington's vital interests, Trump's that. Pompeo's talk about "crushing Iran's tools" with the Defense Ministry's talk of several options for this, is preparing for regional boiling and indirect confrontations in more than one square.
Sanctions against Hezbollah hurt the trade circle surrounding the party
In Iraq, there is a US chance of a possible alliance between Muqtada al-Sadr and Haidar al-Abadi, isolating Iran's tools, ie, Nuri al-Maliki and the popular crowd. In Syria, there is greater reliance on Russia and Israel to limit Iranian influence. In Lebanon, the task seems more difficult for the Americans because of the depth and power of Tehran and its allies, compared to the weakness and fragmentation of the other side. And in the Gulf, to rely on joint steps to reduce trade with Iran, and better coordination in the war in Yemen.